The hospital industry is a large and complex segment of the economy of the United States. The more than 6,500 acute care hospitals vary widely in both size and services provided, generating significant interest in the efficiency of the industry. In general, however, the industry has not been analyzed from the perspective of an efficient industry structure. Various forms of regulation and the behavior of third-party payers are alleged to have either reduced or eliminated the incentives for efficient markets, resulting in an industry that is inefficiently organized. The recent actions by regulators and third-party payers that provide more incentives for efficient health care delivery systems have generated interest in the nature, causes and remedies of market failure in the hospital industry 1 The overriding task of this article will be to synthesize certain of the published research findings in health economics that pertain to hospitals.
The hospital industry is a large and complex segment of the economy of the United States. The more than 6,500 acute care hospitals vary widely in both size and services provided, generating significant interest in the efficiency of the industry. In general, however, the industry has not been analyzed from the perspective of an efficient industry structure. Various forms of regulation and the behavior of third-party payers are alleged to have either reduced or eliminated the incentives for efficient markets, resulting in an industry that is inefficiently organized. The recent actions by regulators and third-party payers that provide more incentives for efficient health care delivery systems have generated interest in the nature, causes and remedies of market failure in the hospital industry 1 The overriding task of this article will be to synthesize certain of the published research findings in health economics that pertain to hospitals.
In particular, the theme of the survey will center around concepts of market efficiency used by economists in the field of industrial organization. An immediate problem confronted by the authors in carrying out this task is that of coming to an acceptable definition of the field of industrial organization. Bain (who, if not the founder of the field, certainly popularized it) states that industrial organization deals with the organization and working of markets (Bain 1968, p. 1). Scherer states that industrial organization &dquo;is concerned with how productive activities are brought into harmony with society% demands for goods and services through some ongoing mechanism such as a free market, and how variations and imperfections in the organizing mechanism affect the degree of success achieved by producers in satisfying society's wants&dquo; (Scherer 1980, p. 1). Stigler, on the other hand, states that &dquo;there is no such subject as industrial organization. The courses taught under this heading have for their purpose the understanding of the structure and behavior of industries ... of an economy ... [and deal] precisely with the content of [micro] economic theory&dquo; (Stigler 1968, p. 1). Clearly, these definitions are very broad, encompassing most of microeconomic theory (including welfare economics), those aspects of macroeconomic theory that pertain to the manner in which macroeconomic activities feed back to influence market and firm performance, and some aspects of marketing.
Traditionally, economists in industrial organization have compared various market outcomes against those that would occur if the market operated like the standard textbook representation of a competitive market. This environment is used as a benchmark because it generates an equilibrium which guarantees various types of efficiency. First, and most important, the competitive equilibrium leads to allocative efficiertcy: the value society places on the marginal unit of the product in question is just equal to the true cost to society of producing that marginal unit expressed in terms of resources used. In addition, the competitive equilibrium leads to technical efficiency: the equilibrium output is produced by the lowest cost technology. These two efficiency results are the foundation of the strong support economists have for competition and competitive markets; decentralized decision makers end up at a welfare maximizing outcome. Unfortunately, not all decentralized environments lead to this optimal result. The term market failure is used by economists to categorize conditions which cause the observed equilibrium to deviate from this socially optimal result. Briefly, market failure can occur whenever some element or assumption of the competitive model is missing.
The classic examples used by economists in discussions of market failure have centered around externalities or natural monopoly. Externalities arise when property rights are either poorly defined or undefinable.
For example, since no one owns the air above us, this &dquo;free&dquo; good is used inefficiently by firms in their disposal of waste gases, etc. The other classic market failure, natural monopoly, is brought on by the existence of significant economies of scale. This cost condition necessitates that output be produced by one firm large enough to capture the benefits of largescale operation. The competitive paradigm fails in both of these frameworks.
The key point is that in the absence of any market failure, the decentralized operation of the hospital industry would produce efficient market outcomes. The task, then, of any research into the desirability of the observed equilibria is to consider the possibility of market failure. Attendant with any such findings is the analysis of possible changes in the market that would lead to a more efficient result. This article, then, is concerned with an examination of the possible causes and evidence of market failures in the hospital industry. Following traditional lines, this search will consider the structural aspects of the industry, especially those pertaining to the underlying cost technology facing any firm in (or considering entry into) the hospital sector.
Industrial organization economists have attempted to identify market failure in different ways. Bain argued that deviations from the structural characteristics of competitive markets can be used to predict deviations from competitive performance, the latter constituting : deviations from the welfare optimum (Bain 1968, p 3). Stigler, and to some extent Scherer, stress the weakness in placing too much reliability on market structure as a predictor of economic performance. Instead, those authors hold that one should place greater reliance on market behavior or conduct, the latter generally being defined so as to include policies pertinent to price and product determination.
More recently, a body of literature drawn together by Baumol, Panzer, and Willig (B-P-W) has introduced a new approach to evaluate market performance. The thrust of this approach to analyzing markets is to divorce itself from the structural norms of the competitive model that pertain to numbers and size distribution of firms in an industry. This is accomplished by placing increased emphasis on entry conditions as predictors of market performance. Using stronger criteria for free entry than did Bain or Stigler, B-P-W introduce the concept of a perfectly contestable market, defined as a market in which entry is free, potential entrants have access to the same market demands add production technology as the incumbent firms, and potential entrants evaluate the desirability of entry on incumbents' preentry prices (Baumol, Panzer, and Willig 1982, pp. 4-8) . This approach rests heavily on the cost structures of single and multiproduct firms.
Clearly, these definitions and approaches leave the field too broadly defined to be treated in one article, even though the focus is on its application to a single industry. Therefore, an attempt is made here to use elements from both the traditional and the B-P-W approaches to synthesize research on the structural efficiency of hospital markets. The other major source of market failure that we will consider deals with the wellknown information problems inherent in health care markets. Consumers of health care services are not well informed either about the actual state of their health or the necessity for and the efficacy of the medical care they receive. In addition, institutional patterns of payment have arisen which have drastically distorted incentives. For example, providers and consumers have different motivations under comprehensive insurance with copayments and prepaid comprehensive health insurance. These factors can result in dramatically different outcomes, none of which may approach the social optimum. Asymmetry in the distribution of risk or information can be an important cause of market failure. This article will start with a brief descriptive view of the industry. The structure of hospital markets will be described in this section. After considering current hospital market structures, possible causes of the structural patterns are examined. Most prominently, cost functions of hospitals are discussed in order to determine whether existing market structures conform to or deviate from those predicted by the cost functions. The authors then examine the possible causes of market failure and the possibility of some industry characteristic preventing the market from reaching an efficient outcome. Here the article will present the theoretical basis for (against?) market failure in the hospital industry. Subsequent examination of the available empirical evidence, in combination with the descriptive statistics presented in the first section of the article, will aid in the process of ascertaining the degree of market failure. The next section considers possible solutions to the problem of market failure. It explores in detail the extensive regulation imposed on the industry. As economists have demonstrated in studies of other industries, the pattern of regulating activity in any market can either diminish the problems of market failure or introduce new distortions which may serve to exacerbate the ills. This section also includes an analysis of the development of other market-based institutions which attempt to reduce the risk and information externalities. Since this fast growing sector is relatively new, it offers little empirical evidence of success or failure. However, its importance should not be understated. The last section of the article offers summary statements and outlines areas where significant gaps exist in knowledge.
The overriding theme of the work reviewed in this article supports the argument that the regulatory environment in which hospitals operate and the nature of third-party payment systems have provided very limited incentives for efficient production and consumption of health care resources and, therefore, significant market failure has occurred in the form of both production and consumption inefficiencies. This appears to be more true for earlier time periods, with more recent years witnessing some evolution. Changes in the regulatory environment are necessary to generate incentives for changes both in market structure, and producer and consumer behavior. Policies that shift increasing amounts of financial risk from third-party payers to consumers and producers should continue to bring increased efficiency to hospital markets. The significance of this is that the underlying problem does not appear to be inherent in the structure of the markets. There is little evidence of economies of scale that would necessitate monopoly market structures. Rather, the underlying problems that have led to market failure are found in the nature of regulatory and reimbursement policies.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
The hospital industry is of particular interest to students,of industrial organization because it embodies a number of unique structural and organizational characteristics. However, the structure of hospital markets was not a subject of extensive discussion until recently. Interest grew in this area as researchers began addressing the question of whether marketoriented incentives would result in more efficient markets. A thorough understanding of the structure of an industry is fundamental to answering such a query. Most structural data on hospitals have been gathered by the health planning authorities and other regulatory bodies, whose interests have naturally been within political rather than market boundaries. The result has been that research in which structural information has been reported was not oriented to analyses of market behavior. Therefore, structural information on hospital markets relates to geographic or political areas which may or may not correctly delineate economic markets. However, useful descriptive statistics on the hospital component of the health care sector can be drawn from these data.
DESCRIPTION OF HOSPITAL STRUCTURES2
Hospitals account for the largest segment of health care expenditures. In 1983, $147.2 billion was spent on hospital care, 43.9 percent of total expenditures ($355.4 billion) on health care (Gibson et al. 1984 ). These hospitals are configured in a variety of sizes, shapes and ownership forms. As shown in Table 1 , the number of hospitals, both community and in total, decreased between 1975 and 1983.3 In contrast, the number of for-profit hospitals declined during the early years of the decade, but has shown increases since 1982. , Hospitals, 1975 Hospitals, -1983 Source: American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics, 1984. Characteristics, 1975 Characteristics, -1983 . ~ S ource: American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics, 1984. Hospitals also exhibit considerable variation in size, a variable usually measured in terms of bed capacity. Table 2 shows that the average number of beds in a community hospital has been increasing since 1975; beds per hospital grew from 160.3 in 1975 to 176 in 1983. Further examination indicates that the distribution of hospital size is quite skewed. Thirty-five percent of all community hospital bed capacity is provided by the top 10 percent of the hospitals. This group has an average size of more than 300 beds. Its work load is also significant; these hospitals treat 34 percent of all admissions and account for 43 percent of the expenditures for care in community hospitals. At the other extreme, community hospitals with a capacity of less than 100 beds make up 45 percent of the total number of hospitals, yet represent only 14 percent of total bed capacity and handle just 13 percent of total admissions. In fact, there are approximately 225 community hospitals with 25 or fewer beds and 1,200 with 50 or fewer beds.
The economic effects of this skewed distribution are unclear. Skewed size distributions can indicate dominant firm problems: several large suppliers with relatively no competition. However, the particular information we have is not useful when attempting to discuss localized market phenomena. These numbers are national aggregates and provide very little guidance as to market competition. The small hospitals could be located in rural communities with no competition, or they could be specialist providers in communities with larger, more general hospitals. Thus, while it appears that relatively few hospitals dominate the statistics, the actual degree of competitiveness could be quite high. This point will be elaborated upon later in this section.
One of the more significant recent developments in hospital structure has been the emergence of multihospital systems. Ermann and Gabel (1984) report that the number of multihospital systems increased from 202 in 1975 to 256 in 1982, an average annual rate of 3.4 percent. The percentage of short-term acute care hospitals in the United States belonging to multihospital systems grew to 33 percent in 1982 from 25 percent in 1978. Again, a pattern of skewed distribution arises. The 34 investorowned systems are much larger than the not-for-profit systems, the former having an average of 23 hospitals and 3,100 beds per system.
It is important to consider the economic motive for the rise of these multihospital systems. Their primary potential advantages might be better access to capital, economies of scale, system diversification, more productive personnel and management distribution, and system planning and organization. Contract management, another growing phenomenon among hospitals, may provide many of these benefits without actually requiring a full merger of the hospitals. However, contract management is not likely to provide improved access to capital markets. Such access is increasingly necessary for hospitals in order to maintain their capital facilities and to participate in integration into other areas of the health care sector. For example, 55.1 percent of the multisystems own ambulatory care facilities, 50 percent own nursing homes, 12 percent own HMOs, 72 percent oivn physician office buildings, and 43 percent own health care management consulting businesses (Ermann and Gabel 1984, p. 55) . Comparable data are not available for hospitals that do not belong to systems. However, it is generally believed that single facility hospitals are participating in the movement toward integration, the causes of which will be discussed more fully in a later section of this article.
The varying mixes of services offered by short-term acute care hospitals truly make them multiproduct firms. The American Hospital Association identifies 46 unique services. The Health Care Financing Administration divides the outputs of hospitals into 467 Diagnosis-Related Groups for purposes of classifying hospital outputs provided to recipients of Medicare. Therefore, it is difficult to categorize and, thus, to measure the outputs of hospitals. However, as an example of the disparity of services offered by different hospitals, consider the fact that while all short-term acute care hospitals provide basic nursing and emergency services, only 10.5 percent of all hospitals in the , United States maintain open-heart surgery facilities .4 Thirty-four percent operate CT scanners, 15.8 percent provide cardiac catheterization, .6.2 percent operate blood banks, and 16.0 percent provide radiation x-ray therapy, while only 3.8 percent provide organ transplants. ' Larger hospitals generally offer a larger spectrum of services, including more tertiary care services. The widest range of services is usually offered by university hospitals and regional tertiary care facilities, e.g., the hospitals used by physicians from the Mayo clinic. This seems to be changing. Joskow points out that the range of medical services available in smaller hospitals has increased in the last decade in response to competition for the increased flow of medical specialists into health care markets (Joskow 1980 ).
HOSPITAL MARKET STRICTURE
The above description of the overall economic activity of the hospital industry did not offer any evidence as to the actual degree of competitiveness of the industry. In order to move toward that goal, data on market statistics are necessary. It is very useful to provide a description of the manner in which hospital markets are delineated prior to discussing hospital market structure. Political boundaries are straightforward; economic boundaries are more difficult. The origin of patients using particular hospitals or groups of hospitals has been widely used as a practical attempt to define economic markets.5
While there is no known delineation of a large sample of hospital markets, certain generalizations can be made from the limited information available. First, the largest segment of patients at most hospitals resides in relatively close proximity to the hospital. Second, a large number of patients living close to one hospital utilizes other hospitals. This phenomenon is greater when the nearby hospital is small; however, it still exists to a significant degree when both hospitals are large. Small hospitals (usually offering fewer services than large community and/or teaching hospitals) compete directly with large hospitals for the services offered by both. Rural hospitals often are small with the ability to provide only limited services. Nevertheless, their patient flow patterns are similar to those in large metropolitan areas, even though distances may be greater. Thus, the rural hospital is in direct competition with other small and larger hospitals in nearby communities In contrast, major tertiary care centers, such as university hospitals, serve patients from very large geographic areas, possibly encompassing the entire nation. In some cases these centers are willing to bid for patients of HMOs, located far away from the hospital, who are in need of specific services, such as openheart surgery or organ transplants. Thus, the hospital is in direct competition with a large number of widely dispersed hospitals. It is necessary to draw some practical conclusions from this evidence. If viewed from the perspective of the hospital-patient market (as we have been discussing), hospital markets for most services probably encompass, at a minimum, a single Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. They also include communities that do not have any other SMSAs nearer to them, even though some of the communities also contain hospitals (Lynk 1984) . For the more exotic services offered by tertiary care centers, the market may encompass multiple metropolitan areas as well as less populated regions around those areas. Therefore, patients within most communities that have a single hospital live in reasonable proximity, as exhibited by patient origin analysis, to other alternative hospitals. This is true even for people in more sparsely populated sections of the country. In fact, Farley reported that only 265 of the 6,000 community hospitals in the United States meet the criteria for classification as sole community hospitals set forth by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the Social Security Act Amendments of 1983 (Farley 1985) . This general description of the problems of delineating the boundaries of markets in which hospitals compete provides further caveat to the structural information available. That information, generally available on the basis of hospital bed concentration within SMSAs, will tend to understate the true boundaries of the market and, therefore, overstate the levels of market concentration.7 The average two-firm concentration ratio for 211 SMSAs is 0.584. There is a large amount of variation in this value. Large metropolitan areas tend to have very low two-firm concentration ratios.8 For example, the ratio is 8 percent for Chicago, 7 percent for New York, and 10 percent for San Francisco. At the other extreme, smaller metropolitan areas have high two-firm concentration ratios. This ratio is 75 percent for Pensacola, Fla., 72 percent for Topeka, Kans., and 73 percent for Sioux Falls, S. Dak.9 9 Certain tentative conclusions can be drawn from this structural information. First, there are very few, if any, hospitals which operate in monopoly markets. Second, hospitals in large metropolitan markets approach an atomistic structure with a large number of hospitals having very small market shares. Third, smaller metropolitan areas tend to be somewhat more concentrated, approximating an oligopolistic structure. However, hospitals in these areas usually compete with regional tertiary care centers in larger metropolitan areas. Thus, it is unlikely that much of the evidence of market failure in hospital markets is the direct result of structural conditions in those markets. Hospital markets have attracted the attention of industrial organization economists, as well as those in other specialized areas of economics, largely because of the substantial evidence of market failure in those markets. Expenditures for health care increased at an average annual compound growth rate of 13.9 percent between 1960 and 1979, while the average rate of increase in the overall Consumer Price Index was only 5 percent over the same period (Joskow 1981, p. 13 ). This is not meant to imply that all inflation in the hospital industry is the result of market failure. Some of the price increases are the result of increased demand for hospital services brought about by growth in the population, changes in the demographic mix of the population and changes in real income. Even more important may be the continuing expansion of insurance coverage. Insurance may result in substantial waste if the contracts do not generate risk-sharing mechanisms that provide for efficient consumption and production of health care services. Moving to the production side, some health care cost increases may be the result of changes in input costs. Rapidly changing technology in hospitals contributes greatly to these cost increases. Finally, it is always possible that some component of the cost increases may result from internal inefficiencies in the operation of hospitals.
INVESTIGATION
Other evidence of market failure is provided by the significant amount of excess capacity in the hospital industry. Occupancy levels in U.S. hospitals ranged from less than 10 percent to over 90 percent in 1983.1° Over 18 percent of hospitals had occupancy rates of less than 50 percent in 1983, while only 22 percent had rates greater than 80 percent. Occupancy rates have been declining as a result of reductions in both admissions and average lengths of stay (ALOS) in recent years. The ALOS varies from 10.0 days in Omaha, Neb., to 5.9 days in El Paso, Tex. An American Hospital Association sample of states indicates that the ALOS varies from a high of 9.6 days in New York to a low of 5.4 days in Utah. Admissions per thousand population and cost per admission vary similarly. As with the case of price increases, dearly not all excess capacity or variation in ALOS, hospital admissions, or charges result from market failure. However, some levels of occupancy are too low to be explained by peak load problems. Not all variations in ALOS, hospital admissions, and charges can be explained by differences in demographic characteristics of the patient population and input costs. In fact, a former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare testified in 1979 that almost $7 billion of waste in the health care sector resulted from excess capacity and unnecessary duplication of facilities Uoskow 1981).
In this section we will explore some possible causes of market failure by examining the environment in which hospitals operate. It was demonstrated earlier in this article that the actual hospital market structure was not indicative of market failure arising from the standard &dquo;monop-olist&dquo; problems. Thus, some different forces must be uncovered to explain the pattern of market failure. To accomplish this task, we begin with an examination of the underlying cost technology of hospital operation. If this technology is sufficiently perverse, the industry may be totally unable to support the decentralized actions of a competitive market. We then consider other possible causes of market failure, causes somewhat unique to the evolution of the hospital industry. Here, we will concentrate on the impact on hospital behavior of the relationship behveen third-party payers, physicians and hospitals, and the broader information environment in which they operate.
THE COST STRUCTURE OF HOSPITALS
There is some evidence on the nature and extent of competitive performance that could exist in hospital markets. It is important to examine the various possible causes of market structure. The nature of the cost structure of the firms often dictates how an efficient market is structured and, therefore, the outcome of other performance dimensions. That is, the cost technology can often &dquo;demand&dquo; that the competitive scenario is unfit for an industry.
Estimates of the cost functions of hospitals have been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere (Feldstein 1974; Jacobs 1974; Berki 1972; Hefty 1969; Cowing, Holtman, and Powers 1983) . Therefore, only general conclusions will be drawn from these studies. Early cost studies concentrated on estimating the degree of economies of scale associated with hospitals. These investigations used very aggregate indices of hospital output, e.g., admissions, bed capacity, bed capacity adjusted for occupancy rates, and bed days of service provided. These early cost studies found evidence of significant economies of scale, usually up to a hospital size of approximately 500 beds (Coiving, Holtman, and Powers 1983). Feldstein (1974) concluded that there are neither significant economies nor diseconomies of scale. In fact, refinements of these early studies indicate some economies of scale up to a relatively small size, usually considered to be in the vicinity of 100-150 beds. These studies have been criticized for improper treatment of long-run and short-run effects. However, Feldstein's (1974) second major conclusion is that the short-run marginal cost of additional patient care is much lower than the average cost.
A scale index developed from a variety of weighting systems has been used in most studies that account for case mix (Pauly 1978; Rafferty 1971; Lave, Lave, and Silverman 1972; Feldstein and Schuttinga 1977; Luke 1979 ). The consensus of these studies is that case-mix effects explain between one-half and two-thirds of the cost variation among hospitals.l These and early studies have also been criticized for their failure to explicitly account for product mix and quality. Although quality usually has been excluded, recent cost studies have used various methods to account for differences in product mix. Differences in service mix may result in economies of scope, i.e., cost advantages to multiproduct firms. Definitionally, economies of scope occur when the product mix is such that the resource costs of producing the bundle of products jointly are less than the sum of the resource costs of producing them separately (Baumol, Panzer, and Willig 1982) . used a translog functional form to estimate the short-run cost function of hospitals. This method assumes no specific functional form for the cost func-tion and so uses the flexible form, the translog.12 Cowing and Holtman found only limited evidence of economies of scope. The stock of capital was included in their model to capture long-run equilibrium effects. The empirical results lead to the apparent conclusion that hospitals have too much capital. 13 . Many gaps remain in the knowledge this literature has generated concerning hospital cost structures. New econometric techniques have been developed to deal with the multiservice nature of hospitals. Also, data bases are being generated that provide hospital output categorized into 467 Diagnosis-Related Groups. The sample sizes of these data are now becoming large enough to meet the needs of the new econometric estimation techniques. Therefore, new research findings should be forthcoming in this area which will answer important questions. The more obvious examples include estimates of appropriate configurations of hospitals, the effects of hospital mergers, the effects on efficiency of specialized service centers (e.g., outpatient surgery centers and ob-gyn centers), the differences in capital costs between not-for-profit and proprietary hospitals and the effects of these differences on case mix, to mention a few. However, the evidence of only limited economies of scale suggests that hospital markets, except for those that are very small, need not be monopolistically structured. ' HOSPITAL OBJECTIVES . The hospital industry has the unusual characteristic of simultaneous operation of proprietary and nonproprietary firms. That is, hospitals do not necessarily follow the single objective of profit maximization generally attributed to most for-profit firms in the economy. There are a number of reasons for this. As stated earlier in this article, a large number of hospitals are not-for-profit. In fact, many markets are serviced solely by not-for-profit hospitals. Therefore, due to this phenomenon and other market imperfections discussed later, it is possible for hospitals to operate according to objective functions that contain criteria other than profit maximization. 14 This type of behavior can lead to outcomes different from those of a competitive market.
Many of the early attempts to model hospital behavior postulate that hospitals maximize output. These models recognize that, in order to maximize output, hospitals compete for high-quality attending physicians. Reder argues that physicians want privileges at hospitals that are fully equipped and that permit the physician to treat as wide a range of ailments as the physicians competence permits (Reder 1965 ). Newhouse formalizes this contention by placing quality in the hospitals objective function and constraining the hospital to a break-even solution (Newhouse 1970) . Assuming that increases in quality will increase demand for the hospitals services at a rate less than the increase in operating costs guarantees an equilibrium at a finite level of output. Feldstein (1971) attempts to explain hospital cost inflation in a model that follows the pattern of Newhouse (1970) . This model treats quality as an explicit function of the hospitals labor and capital inputs. Hospital services are considered a free good to attending physicians. Therefore, physicians always demand more hospital inputs (quality).
Lee argues that hospital administrators attempt to maximize their status relative to competitors. This is achieved through defensive actions, whereby the objective is to minimize the difference between the actual and desired inputs of the hospital subject to a break-even condition. Therefore, hospitals may increase expenditures on inputs without increasing output or revenues, due to the defensive nature of the hospital (Lee 1971 ).
All of the models described to this point depict the hospital as being controlled by hospital administrators with the objective of maximizing output. Pauly and Redisch (1973) change the assumption of administrator control by assuming that hospitals are controlled de facto by their medical staffs. These staffs are assumed to have the objective of maximizing their joint incomes. &dquo;
Watts takes an intermediate position arguing that the extent of medical staff control of hospital administration depends upon the competitive environment for physicians. Where competition exists for physicians, hospitals will operate as physician cooperatives. On the other hand, she argues that hospitals with monopsony power over the &dquo;purchase&dquo; of physicians will maximize their administrators utility over such factors as income and prestige (Watts 1976 ). Harris expands on this dichotomy within the hospital, arguing that the hospital is made up of two internal organizations: the administrative staff that manages the provision of diagnostic, therapeutic, and hotel services, and the medical staff that admits and treats patients. Harris refers to this as a command and control system, whereby the medical staff commands hospital services for the patients and the administration attempts to control (administer) the availability of these services with little actual control over who is admitted and how many units of the services will be demanded (Harris 1977) . The significant result of the models developed by Pauly and Redisch, Watts, and Harris is that price (the normal guide to economic efficiency) is suppressed, output is expanded beyond efficient levels and, since quality becomes the main form of competition, excess quality and duplication result.
Finally, Custer (1984) argues that the relationship between the hos-pital and its medical staff is more complex than the notion of a free workshop implies. Custer assumes that, under zero coinsurance, the purchase of a unit of health care will provide a certain quantity of health, the latter being a function of the quality of the physician and the hospital at which the physician practices. Physicians, according to Custer, choose a set of office and hospital characteristics which influences the prices physicians can charge. Unlike the previous studies, Custer assumes that there are costs attendant to affiliating with a hospital, e.g., physician time on committees. The optimal choice set is one that maximizes physician income subject to the recognized cost of operating the office. Likewise, Custer assumes that hospitals maximize profits by choosing an affiliation fee and/or attribute combination. The model predicts that competition among hospitals lowers the number of physicians a hospital can attract at any affiliation fee and/or attribute combination, i.e., hospital competition reduces the cost to physicians of hospital characteristics. This prediction, which was supported by empirical analysis, is identical to the postulation in earlier studies that hospitals indirectly compete for patients by enhancing quality. In summary, the models all suggest that the behavior of hospitals has not focused on price competition, the usual element which enforces efficiency in competitive markets. Even though price competition was an element in many of the models described, quality competition predominated. The result has been outcomes characterized by excessive quality and capital expenditures, and unnecessary duplication of services. Therefore, it is necessary to direct our attention to why competition does not enforce efficiency, i.e., to other causes of market failure.
RISK-SHARING MECHANISMS AS A CAUSE

OF MARKET FAILURE
In 1980, over 90 percent of the expenditures for hospital services were paid by public and private insurers. Approximately two-thirds of the expenditures for all types of health services were paid by third parties (Gibson and Waldo 1981) . The existence of insurance in hospital markets is not the problem. Insurance, by reducing the financial risk to patients and providers, greatly increases economic welfare (Arrow 1963) . Market failure has occurred as a result of the characteristics health insurance has developed in the United States.
Private insurers were the first to emerge on a broad basis. Blue Cross plans originated during the depression years to cover hospital costs, along with Blue Shield plans to cover physician costs, 15 The plans have certain characteristics that relate to issues of market failure. The Blue Cross plans, as part of their enabling legislation, were to operate as notfor-profit insurers in return for favorable tax treatment in many states (Reed 1947; Frech 1974) . From the perspective of the insurance markets, lower costs derived from the tax advantages permitted Blue Cross to obtain a dominant position in many insurance markets (Frech 1979) . The not-for-profit status of the plans, when coupled with the tax advantages, led to a surplus which could not be distributed as dividends. The actual distribution of this surplus has resulted in a property rights struggle among the providers, plan administrators, and the insureds. If some of the benefits from the tax advantages were passed on to consumers by means of lower premiums for equal coverage or greater coverage for the same premium cost as that offered by for-profit commercial insurance companies, these companies would be substantially impeded in competing effectively. This does not appear to be the cause. 16 Thus, competition must exist between plan administrators and providers for the undistributed residuals that result from the tax advantages. Substantial evidence has been found that supports the hypothesis that each of these groups captures some of these residuals. Administrative slack and greater insurance-loading charges (Frech and Ginsburg 1978; Frech 1976; Vogel 1977; Eisenstadt and Kennedy 1981) and higher provider charges were found to be related to the levels of the tax advantages (Amould and Eisenstadt 1981; Amould and DeBrock 1984a, 1985; Sloan I984).. _ More critical to hospital markets is the tax treatment of health insurance premiums paid by individuals or for individuals by their employers. Along these lines, it is also important to consider the methods by which hospitals are reimbursed by insurers. Insurance effectively reduces the marginal cost of health care by an amount proportional to the level of coverage. Therefore, all other things being equal, consumers with insurance will demand more units of health care. Medicare and Medicaid, publicly funded health insurance programs, have generated similar increases in demand for health care services.
Tax treatment of insurance premiums in the United States has eliminated most of the income effect associated with the reduced marginal costs of health care for the consumer (Gensheimer 1985) . Premiums paid by both individuals and corporations are treated as a deductible expense. For many individuals, the premiums are a part of an employee-benefit t package which is not considered to be taxable income. Therefore, the impact of any increase in premiums during a coverage period, regardless of the amount of health care consumed in the previous period, is greatly diminished. The result is a significant amount of market failure in the form of moral hazard resulting in both excessive insurance coverage and excessive consumption of health care services. Consumers anticipate low out-of-pocket expenses for health care services, resulting in artificially high levels of demand. Financial risks are shifted from the consumer of health care services to third-party insurers (Feldstein 1974; Arrow 1963; Zeckhauser 1970) . Traditional reimbursement mechanisms developed by public and private insurers permitted similar shifting of risk from providers to thirdparty payers. Providers were, and in many cases still are, paid for health care on a retrospective fee-for-service basis with fees set by a variety of cost-plus pricing mechanisms. This system generates more revenue to providers if more services are provided and does not increase the financial risk to the provider. Therefore, providers had an incentive to expand output, generating additional moral hazard.
The problem of moral hazard is further complicated by two information problems. First, consumer knowledge of health care production is generally limited and costly to obtain. The primary care physician generally fulfills two roles for the patient: diagnosis and production. The physician functions as an agent for the patient, prescribing the treatment necessary and then supplying the patient with his own and other health care inputs (Evans 1983 ). However, because insurance greatly reduces the marginal cost of health care services, the second problem emerges-neither the consumer nor the primary care physician has an incentive to search for low-cost providers (Feldstein 1974; Frech 1984) . ' Attempts to document increases in costs and expenditures attributable to moral hazard are numerous (Feldstein 1973 ). Pauly (1969) More recently, the Rand group, in a controlled experiment, found that 25 and 50 percent copayments reduced the average total ambulatory and hospital care expenditures by 19 and 30 percent, respectively (Newhouse 1978; Phelps 1982; Phelps and Newhouse 1972) . Phelps (1982) further estimates that taxing half of private insurance premiums would reduce health care expenditures by $12 to $13 billion, over $7 billion of which is spent on hospital services.
In summary, this section has attempted to present the possible sources of market failure in the hospital market. The evidence of market failure is abundant and the cost of these market imperfections is large. However, unlike many industries analyzed by those who study industrial organization, market structure itself appears to have little to do with market failure. Likewise, the available evidence on cost functions indicates that the underlying cost technology is not the cause of market failure.
Cost structures are sufficiently regular to permit normal competitive outcomes. Instead, market failure in the hospital market is the result of behavioral characteristics and information problems in which price, the usual tool that enforces market efficiency, is largely ignored. The fact that prices are ignored by both suppliers and consumers leads to obvious problems.
RESPONSES TO MARKET FAILURE
This section tums to an examination of attempts to diminish or eliminate the inefficiencies brought forth by market failure. The traditional response to market failure has been regulation: government intervention designed to control some aspect of firm behavior. In the present context, several new and innovative institutional arrangements have arisen. These market-based arrangements are designed to provide incentive schemes which have the effect of countering the information and risk externalities mentioned earlier.
ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE EFFICIENCY
As just suggested, government intervention into the workings of a market is often the most efficient method to control the problems associated with market failure. However, economists have also demonstrated that some regulatory activity can arise at the urging of certain interest groups. This concept, known as Capture Theory, relates to cases where participants (suppliers or consumers) in a market are able to convince public officials of the need for regulatory control which, while apparently well intended, is actually devised to benefit the group being regulated. The literature has many examples of markets operating quite efficiently ttnfil the regulatory intervention distorted outcomes to a less efficient equilibrium. This point cannot be overstated. It is important to keep the historical pattern of regulation in mind as one considers such a response to market failure. It may be the case that regulation is, in fact, a cause of market failure, rather than a remedy.
Attempts to regulate hospital behavior pertinent to the theme of this article began with the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (Hill-Burton). The purpose of this bill was to provide grants and subsidies to the states for new hospital construction and hospital renovation. Growth in hospital capacity was thought necessary to meet increasing demands for hospital services resulting from population growth, technological change in the treatment of health problems, and public and private insurance. Federal programs to expand medical education and, thus, the supply of physicians began in 1963. Both programs were very successful in achieving their intended purposes. These subsidies to the hospital and physician service markets dramatically reduced barriers to entry in both areas. Although the major reasons for the subsidies centered around the theme of providing patients with better access to the health care system, an economic result of the reduced barriers to entry brought about by lower capital costs and increased spaces in medical schools should have been an outward shift in the supply curve and a reduction (or reduced rate of expansion) in the marginal supply price of medical services. Clearly, this was not the case. In fact, there is evidence that prices were, and continue to remain, higher in areas where the supply of medical services is greater. This evidence again points to the risk-sharing problems in the reimbursement mechanisms discussed earlier as a cause of market failure.
In the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, regulation turned to more direct control of hospital costs. The Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 (CHP) was intended to fund state agencies to develop regional plans for health facilities. CHP agencies were given little control over hospital supply decisions except through their limited input on Hill-Burton or Public Health Service funding. The National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 (HPRDA) established a number of health systems agencies {HSAs) which were designed to halt the escalating costs of health care by regulating hospital construction. By far the most significant feature of the HPRDA is the requirement that states establish certificate-of-need (CON) programs for expansion of bed space and other types of service where the capital investment needed to offer those services is greater than a threshold level. CON regulation required that any hospital that wished to expand, add new programs, or purchase new equipment, the cost of which was above a threshold, must submit a very detailed application documenting the need for the proposed expansion to the local and state HSAs. The threshold levels varied from state to state. However, the application process was very costly to health care providers and taxpayers in terms of manpower and time delays. These regulations have proven to be quite important in the final outcomes of many hospital market configurations. Two effects can be expected from CON regulation. First, CON establishes a barrier to entry, protecting the status quo. Thus, if existing hospitals are inefficient, they will remain inefficient (Sloan and Steinwald 1980) . Second, entry regulation into an industry that does not have natural barriers to entry often leads to inefficient forms of competition (Douglas and Miller 1974) . The airline industry provides an example.
Prohibited from price competition and protected from entry, the airlines turned to quality competition by increasing the frequency of flights, the size of aircraft, and in-flight amenities. The result was substantial excess capacity and higher costs per passenger. Analysis of the effects of CON on hospital costs provides results ranging from no evidence of reduced capital expenditures (Watts and Updegraff 1975) , reduced growth of licensed acute care beds but increased growth of psychiatric, extended and special care beds (Bicknell and Walsh 1975) , to reduced growth of hospital beds but increases in employees and auxiliary services per bed (Salkever and Bice 1976) . Clearly, the current amount of excess capacity and duplication of services in the industry is evidence that CON was never a formidable barrier to entry. Finally, the evidence suggests that CON may have resulted in further market failure by generating an incentive for nonoptimal input mixes.
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) were established in 1972 to serve as watchdogs over Medicare performance. PSROs reviewed Medicare patient bills in order to eliminate services that deviated from accepted norms, namely, that had greater social costs than benefits. However, these systems failed, largely because of the difficulty in developing generally accepted measures of social benefits and costs. The PSROs then reverted to the use of industry norms. Unfortunately, industry norms provided inefficient guidelines because the data used to establish the norms were taken from a period when providers had little or no incentive to operate efficiently (Zeckhauser and Zook 1981; Sloan and Steinwald 1980) . In the late 1970s and early 1980s, numerous state governments in addition to the federal government turned to various cost caps and the Medicare section 223 limits of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1972. These limits pertained to total reimbursements related to daily service charges. However, these limits were not inclusive of high-technology ancillary services. The result was a pattern of cost shifting from covered services to other services and from Medicare and Medicaid patients to private-pay patients (Meyer 1983) . Section 223 limits, like CON, may have further aggravated the market failure by resulting in nonoptimal input mixes.
Since 1969, eight states have instituted mandatory hospital rate regulation, Rhode Island has a cooperative program, and four additional states have mandatory advisory hospital rate review programs (Joskow 1981) .~ The limited evidence that exists on the effectiveness of rate regulation is mixed. Joskow (1981) , for example, concludes that the rate of increase in both total hospital expenditures and expenditures per patient-day were lower for the regulated states than for a comparison group of unregulated states. However, this evidence is subject to criticism when analyzed on a state-by-state basis. Further, it suffers from failure to take into account other possible distortions caused by the regulation.
There should be little surprise at the inadequacy of these regulatory attempts to improve the efficiency of hospital markets when one recalls the causes of market failure. Evidence points to the fact that the causes of market failure are behavioral and not structural. They result largely from a risk-sharing system which provides improper incentives for the efficient production and consumption of health services, as well as information imperfections. None of these problems was addressed by the various types of regulation summarized in this article.
INNOVATIONS IN FINANCING AND DELIVERY
One economic phenomenon is clear from the literature reviewed so far. Hospitals, even nonproprietary hospitals, do respond to economic incentives. When third-party payers eliminated the effects of price competition, hospitals responded with quality competition. Similarly, when able to shift financial risks to third-party payers, hospitals responded by producing (and patients by consuming) excessive amounts of hospital services. Thus, economists can have some optimism that changes in the incentive structure will lead to more efficient market performance.
Many policy changes have been proposed by public authorities. In addition, many private parties have independently developed new programs. The most important characteristic of these programs is their common attempt to generate greater incentives for competitive behavior on the part of both consumers and providers. Some of these programs have been implemented, while some are still in the discussion stage. Those that are being implemented or are in the process of being made operational will be reviewed here, with a brief discussion of provider response.18 Unfortunately, while this section may deal with arguably the most exciting developments in the hospital industry, the data are quite sparse. Thus, in some cases we can offer only speculation as to expected results.
A variety of proposals have been made to eliminate the tax subsidy responsible for excessive insurance coverage. Many also are concerned with the low levels of copayments and deductibles. The most extensive plan, put forth by Enthoven (1978) , would replace the current tax exclusion of health insurance premiums with a fixed tax credit. Aspects of this plan are contained in a number of bills currently before Congress. The intent of eliminating or placing a cap on the tax exclusion is to provide consumers with a financial incentive to seek efficient health care providers. Although the potential savings from such actions are great, this policy has not been implemented. Thus, no empirical evidence exists to support these claims.
Actions have been taken in both the public and private sectors to shift more financial risk to producers and consumers in an effort to reduce expenditures on health care. There has been a significant increase in the level of deductibles and copayments required by the health care portion of many employee-benefit plans. A 1985 survey of 1,200 companies by Hewlitt Associates documents the extent of this increase in deductibles and copayments. The number of companies including deductibles in their employee health plans increased to 52 percent in 1984 from 17 percent in 1982; only 50 percent of the companies provided full coverage of &dquo;room and board&dquo; costs in hospitals in 1984, a decline from 75 percent in 1983. Moreover, those providing full coverage for surgery declined to 27 percent in 1984 from 45 percent in 1979. (Cited in Davis et al. 1985 .) While the total empirical effects of such policies are unclear, we do have some indication of the potential success. Phelps (1982) reported that the interim results of the Rand Health Insurance Study provide evidence that a 25 percent copayment reduces utilization and expenditures by 20 percent. If the results of the experiments analyzed by Phelps can be generalized to the broader population, substantial savings from this change should be forthcoming.
The actions on the part of payers to further utilize market incentives to increase efficiency have led to the rapid development of systems of prospectively determined rates for health care services. These have taken the form of prospective payment systems (PPS), preferred provider arrangements (PPA), and complete prepayment plans. Each form of prospective payment shifts some of the financial risk to the provider and/or consumer. The effects of these systems have led, in turn, to increases in excess capacity and other pressures on health care providers to supply health care services efficiently. This provides a direct incentive for efficient production of hospital ser-vices. The hope is that such a weighting scheme will reduce the interhospital variance in expenditures. Eventually, the hospital-specific and regional weights are to be reduced with more weight being placed on national averages.
This program is too short-lived to provide substantial empirical evidence of increased efficiency.2° Nevertheless, it is clear that the DRG system has provided hospitals with an improved internal mechanism for identifying their production functions. There are three potential problems with the incentives of the system. First, as long as the prospective rates are based on hospital-specific and regional hospital costs it is unclear whether it will provide incentives for hospitals to compete with each other for Medicare patients. However, if rates are set appropriately low, while still held above marginal costs, the incentive to compete for Medicare patients may result in hospital efforts to reduce excess capacity and, thereby, make some contribution to overhead. 21
The second problem is that the PPS does not reduce the incentive to increase revenues through increasing hospital admissions. Finally, where secondary diagnoses are present, it may be possible for hospitals to increase revenues by switching primary and secondary diagnoses in some situations. In this case, the PPS could actually lead to more inefficiencies. No systematic evidence has been found on the extent of these problems with the actual PPS. Karen Davis et al. (1985) review the evidence of the effects of Medicare PPS on hospital utilization. They compare pre-and post-1983 hospital utilization rates and costs. However, the authors preface their results with a very important caveat. Specifically, hospital patient-days for the elderly increased by an average of 3.4 percent per year from 1975 to 1983, and then declined by 8.7 percent from 1983 to 1984, with most of the reduction in patient-days resulting from reduced lengths of stay. At the same time, patient-days for the nonelderly increased by 0.1 percent per year during 1975-83 and declined by 7.4 percent in 1984, the decline due largely to reduced admissions.
Hospital cost increases follow a similar pattern. From 1975 to 1983, hospital costs increased at an average annual rate of 15.7 percent compared to an increase of only 5.4 percent between 1983 and 1984 (Davis et al. 1985) . Cost per patient-day increased by approximately the same amount throughout the entire period. Therefore, the reduction in the rate of increase in hospital costs was the result of fewer patient-days, not reduced cost per patient-day (Davis et al. 1985) .
As can be seen from these data, a substantial change occurred in hospital utilization and costs between 1983 and 1984. The reason for the caveat mentioned earlier, regarding how much of the credit for this change can be attributed to the Medicare PPS, is that changes occurred for non-Medicare as well as Medicare patients. In addition, the Medicare PPS was phased in between October 1983 and September 1984 and certain hospitals in certain states were exempt. Thus, only 25 percent of Medicare payments to hospitals, or less than 5 percent of total hospital reimbursements, were based on the PPS. Finally, Davis et al. (1985) indicate that many of the downward trends in hospital utilization commenced prior to inception of the PPS, providing evidence that hospitals initiated programs to reduce utilization prior to October 1983 in anticipation of the Medicare PPS. Needless to say, the Medicare PPS has resulted in appropriate incentives for increased efficiency in the utilization of health care services. Our ability to separate the quantitative influence of this system from other factors must await the availability of more complete data.
The treatment of capital costs under the Medicare PPS system is a serious issue that needs to be resolved. Currently, capital costs are treated as a pass-through for which hospitals are reimbursed for actual capital costs based on the proportion of patient-days attributed to Medicare patients. Congress has set October 1, 1986, as a deadline for resolving this issue. A dispute between the Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of Management and Budget involves the appropriate levels of &dquo;add-ons&dquo; to DRG payments for capital costs and the appropriate treatment of fixed capital in an industry plagued with excess bed capacity. Senators Durenburger and Quayle introduced a bill in 1985 that calls for a repeal of state health planning and planning program review requirements, and institution of a flat percentage add-on to DRGs. The add-on would be phased in over six years with a hospital weight that declines to zero by the sixth year. Another bill introduced at the same time by Senators Kennedy and Gephardt would provide a DRG-specific add-on adjusted for both the capital intensity of each DRG and regional differences in construction costs. This bill also provides an exemption process for those hospitals for which capital payments were not sufficient to meet principal, interest and lease payments on projects undertaken prior to year-end 1985. Clearly, the treatment of capital costs will have a critical impact on the effectiveness of the PPS as a mechanism for providing efficient capital decisions. If the capital cost payment to hospitals is set too low, it penalizes hospitals with high capital costs, possibly to the extent of exclusion from the market. Unfortunately, these high costs may have resulted from recent renovation projects designed to increase efficiency and reduce costs, such as expanded outpatient surgery facilities. At the same time, low allowances for capital costs may protect hospitals with older and possibly less efficient physical plants. Similarly, unreasonably low payments could discourage other hospitals with older plants and concomitant low capital costs from undertaking capital improvement projects which would increase efficiency, even if these hospitals have high occupancy levels.
If the payments for capital costs are set too high, two effects could occur. First, they might not provide any incentive to reduce the excess capacity which clearly exists in the industry. Second, an Averch-Johnson effect might result (Averch and Johnson 1962) . The Averch-Johnson model, developed to analyze the nature of capital formation in regulated public utilities, predicts that, where the allowed rate of return on capital is greater than the cost of capital, firms have an incentive to overcapitalize. Thus, excessive reimbursements for capital could lead to inefficient expansion of capacity (in the case of hospitals, a lack of contraction) in an industry already plagued by excess capacity.
Determination of the appropriate level of reimbursement for capital costs has been avoided by both public and private payers through the use of selective direct contracting for services between the payer and specific providers. These arrangements, referred to as preferred provider arrangements (PPAs), involve direct negotiation of rates between the preferred provider organization (PPO) and the payer (Trauner 1983 ). Hospitals generally are reimbursed on the basis of discounted usual charges, with negotiated per diem rates or case rates becoming more common. Physicians may be paid either at a rate discounted from usual charges, or on the basis of a negotiated fee schedule. Discounts range from 7 to 15 percent for hospitals and from 5 to 30 percent for physicians (Gabel and Ermann 1985) .
In addition to the determination of the level of coverage of capital costs, PPAs have a number of advantages. They provide appropriate incentives for prices and inputs, as well as contractual controls on the production of priced services. However, the units of priced services may not be controlled effectively. For example, if hospitalization is priced on a per diem rate, an incentive exists for the PPO to efficiently produce a per diem of hospital care, but there isn't any incentive to reduce admissions or lengths of stay. To be effective, therefore, PPAs must contain stringent conditions for utilization review, the cost of which must be weighed against the PPA discounts. More recently, PPAs have contracted selectively for services on a capitation basis in order to eliminate the incentive for unnecessary admissions.
Finally, PPAs provide a mechanism through which health care providers can offer selective price discounts in an attempt to increase the level of capacity utilization. This and other forms of price discounting are not uncommon in industries with excess fixed capital. Railroads in the United States came under regulation in the late 19th century at least partially as a result of the wide price fluctuations which occurred during periods of reduced demand. Trucking rates came under regulation during the 1930s for similar reasons. However, trucking firms do not have high fixed costs. Therefore, it is now common belief that regulation to eliminate price fluctuations was ill conceived and led to welfare losses. When airline rates were deregulated in 1978, one immediate result was selective price discounts to increase load factors. These selective discounts are carefully structured to provide reduced fares and increased utilization among consumers who have high elasticity of demand. The discounts are limited to those with substantial planning time, usually requiring ticket purchase to be made two to four weeks in advance of travel. Many require the traveler to stay at the destination over Saturday night, eliminating their accessibility to business travelers. Similarly, PPAs are offered on a selective basis to payers who have some monopsony power as a result of their ability to guarantee a large volume of patients to the health care provider. Hospitals, which have high fixed costs relative to variable costs, are actively offering discounts in an effort to cover overhead through increased volume.
Probably the most widely publicized case of selective contracting is the California Medicaid system, Medi-Cal. The Medi-Cal program was authorized to accept bids from hospitals for the treatment of Medi-Cal patients in 1982. California law was changed in 1983 to provide for similar contracting by private insurers and for contracting for physician services by both public and private insurers. Selective contracting was viewed by the Medi-Cal program as a necessary substitute for HMO contracting because of the shortage of HMOs. Since it was an alternative, selective contracting provided a mechanism that was reliant upon competitive incentives and the market system. Four important program policies were established by Medi-Cal that facilitated the contracting: (1) Every accredited short-term acute care hospital was invited to negotiate contracts; (2) Hospitals and Medi-Cal worked from, but were not limited to, a &dquo;model&dquo; contract; (3) Payment was on a fixed, per diem basis with only few exceptions; and (4) There were direct negotiations between one state negotiator and the hospital's representative (Johns 1985) . By the end of 1984, 68 percent of the state's eligible hospitals had participated in contract negotiations, of which 70 percent had won contracts. Ninety-two percent of the historical expenditures for inpatient Medi-Cal services in those areas in which contracts existed were covered by negotiated contracts (Johns 1985) .
The effects of selective contracting by Medi-Cal are difficult to assess at this time. Total Medi-Cal savings in the 1983-84 fiscal year were $700 million. The change in payment for inpatient care was estimated to be responsible for $184 million, 26 percent of total savings (Johns 1985) . However, caveats like those discussed earlier concerning the Medicare prospective payment system are in order because ceteris paribus conditions did not hold for a number of other factors. Other states have seen enough promise in this form of PPA to have initiated similar programs.
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have grown rapidly. Gabel and Ermann (1985) report on surveys that found there were 33 PPOs in 1982 and 143 in 1984. Gabel (1985) reports that PPO enrollments rose from 1.3 million participants in December 1984 to 5.8 million in May 1985, a fourfold increase. Hospital and physician groups sponsored nearly one-half of the PPOs, with insurance carriers running closely behind (Gabel and Ermann 1985) . The major weakness of the PPOs reported on by Gabel and Ermann (1985) was the general lack of a rigorous utilization review. Thus, they predicted a continued growth in PPOs, with an increased emphasis on utilization review. Finally, it is important to note that there is some concern that PPOs could, in certain circumstances, be organized so they are anticompetitive rather than procompetitive (Feldstein 1985) . For example, assume that providers, such as hospitals, in the same market area form a PPO. Further, assume that these providers make up a substantial share of the market, are permitted to collude with each other in the prices to be charged by the PPO, are not permitted to offer lower prices to alternative PPOS, and that the PPO has an exclusive arrangement with the enrollees. Under these very rigid circumstances, it may be possible for the providers to use the PPO to fix prices at artificially high levels or to maintain prices by thwarting competition. However, more extensive information about market conditions is necessary to turn this possibility into reality. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have indicated that they have no intent to challenge the PPOs that requested an antitrust review, except in one case. This indicates that most PPOs are structured so as to increase competition in health care markets.
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), the final form of reimbursement mechanism to be discussed, have shown rapid growth as a form of prepaid health care. HMOs provide one contracted source for all the health care needs of the consumer group for a specified premium. With revenues fixed in advance, HMO profits are maximized by minimizing plan costs. By providing comprehensive coverage of the health care needs of the group, the problems of defining the limits of coverage are eliminated. Financial risks are passed on to the providers if they are paid on a per capita rate based on the number of enrollees in the HMO. Therefore, the moral hazard generated by incentives for providers to prescribe excessive units of health services is eliminated.
HMOs should be particularly effective in promoting more efficient delivery of health care services as pressures on consumers to search for efficient providers are increased. In 1970, there were 33 HMOs in the United States serving approximately three million enrollees.22 The number of HMOs grew to 280 by 1983, serving 12.5 million enrollees, and to 337 with 16.7 million enrollees by December 1984 (InterStudy 1985 . Current increases in annual enrollments average 20 percent. The market penetration of HMOs exceeds 25 percent in many cities. Various cost savings of HMOs have been documented. Most of the documented cost savings result from lower hospital admission rates for HMO enrollees than for fee-for-service patients. Luft (1981) , and Manning, Leibowitz, and Goldberg (1984) found that hospital admission rates for enrollees in a number of HMOs frequently were as much as 40 percent lower than for fee-forservice patients. In addition, Amould, DeBrock, and Pollard (1984) found that HMOs produce certain health services more efficiently. One problem with these studies may be selection bias on the part of enrollees. The cost savings found by Luft and others may be diminished as more is discovered about the health and risk characteristics of those individuals who choose HMOs over traditional third-party reimbursement plans. However, Manning, Leibowitz, and Goldberg (1984) found evidence that the Luft results hold up under control for these factors.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES BY PROVIDERS '
The increased risk borne by providers under prepaid plans is generating structural changes among traditional provider roles. One notable change is that providers, in order to minimize total health care costs, are increasing their emphasis on &dquo;wellness&dquo; programs. More significantly, the structure of providers is changing in response to competitive pressures. These structural changes involve simultaneous moves in different directions, all of which are efforts to provide services more efficiently, to respond to consumer tastes and utilities, and to maintain profitable levels of utilization.
Retrospective fee-for-service reimbursement provided no incentive for providers to promote outpatient surgery even when it was more efficient than, and as efficacious as, inpatient surgery. Hospitals which are reimbursed on either a capitation basis or a DRG rate have incentives to require outpatient surgery whenever possible. This has led many hospitals to expand their outpatient surgery facilities. Along with this development, there has been an unbundling of hospital services resulting from the growth of freestanding ambulatory surgery centers which offer one-day treatment for many types of outpatient surgery. There were 330 such centers in 1984 providing over 500,000 surgical procedures, compared with 212 centers in 1982 (Davis et al. 1985) . 23 Similarly, on the physicians' side, the number of emergicenters grew from 260 in 1981 to 2,500 in 1985 (Davis et al. 1985) . Emergicenters are physician offices which usually treat outpatients for minor problems and are heavily oriented to service by maintaining long hours of operation and having convenient locations. These facilities provide convenience to the patient and permit the physician to capture revenues which otherwise would have gone to the hospital.
Hospitals have responded to this disintegration, or unbundling, of hospital services by expanding their outpatient surgical facilities and/or operating freestanding ambulatory care units. The American Hospital Association (1983) survey of multihospital systems found that 55 percent of these systems operate ambulatory care facilities. Davis et al. (1985) , report that multihospital systems operated 1,322 freestanding ambulatory care facilities in 1984.
Another structural change occurring as a result of competition in health care markets, a type of horizontal integration, is the formation of multihospital systems through either mergers and acquisitions or looser affiliations involving shared services. The reason for the extent of this activity was discussed earlier. Many health care planners predict that further horizontal expansion of multihospital systems will diminish in the future. There is very limited information about the effects of multihospital systems on competition in individual hospital markets. Nevertheless, a small number of hospital acquisitions by multihospital systems have been challenged by the antitrust authorities, indicating that, in their judgment, most of these acquisitions will not reduce competition in most hospital markets.
Many multihospital systems are proprietary. However, not all multihospital systems are proprietary nor are all proprietary hospitals part of multihospital systems. In many instances, mergers are bringing notfor-profit institutions into direct competition with for-profit institutions. There is some evidence that these systems attempted to concentrate on those hospitals with high proportions of private-pay and Medicare patients. So long as reimbursement is on a retrospective fee-for-service basis, it is not clear whether the proprietaries would have any impact on market competition because their incentives would be similar to those of the not-for-profits. However, an important unanswered research question concerns the effects potential differences in capital costs and other factors could have on competition between proprietary and nonproprietary hos-pitals, as well as the impact of the newer risk-sharing reimbursement mechanisms.
There has been a rapid growth in medical group practices, some of them facilitated by both single and multihospital systems while others developed independently. Various types of vertical integration among different types of providers also are occurring at a very rapid pace.
In 1980, 26.2 percent of the physicians in the United States were practicing in 10,762 medical groups and the average group practice consisted of eight physicians. By 1984, 29.3 percent of active physicians were in group practices, with an average group size of nine physicians (Arnould, Pollard, and Van Vorst 1985) . Clearly, most physician service markets remain highly atomistically structured with large numbers of independent physicians .24
Group practices may result in economies of scale in the provision of physician services; however, this is an area which has been relatively untapped by researchers. If the group practice is integrated into an HMO, it is more likely that economies of scale in the insurance function may dictate the size of the patient base and, thus, the necessary size of the group practice. Group practices also may have lower contracting and other information costs as well as better internal mechanisms for the control of both quality and utilization than are possible in independent practice associations and other contractual arrangements.
Vertical integration also provides an adequate patient base and places the control of all health care costs and revenues under one organizational unit. Hospitals faced with declining occupancy rates are forming physician group practices in order to attract larger patient bases, as predicted by the hospital models discussed earlier in this article. Regional and tertiary care group practices are diversifying into new geographic markets so as to expand their referral bases. As already mentioned, hospitals and group practices are integrating into the insurance function as well as with each other, the latter to guarantee a place to practice on the part of physicians and a supply of patients on the part of hospitals. Tertiary care centers are establishing satellite primary care facilities to &dquo;guarantee&dquo; a source of referrals to tertiary care physicians. Hospitals are vertically integrating into skilled nursing facilities, home care units, retail pharmacies and medical supply outlets, to mention a sample of the types of integration. Each type of integration by health care providers occurs because of one or more of the following goals: to provide new revenue sources, to achieve economies of scale, and to increase operating efficiencies. No empirical evidence could be found on the extent of revenues generated by hospitals which move into other provider areas. Evidence cited throughout this article suggests that the insurance function is the only area in which economies of scale are important. If the studies cited earlier are correct, most of the potential increases in efficiency will have to come from provider integration. The most likely sources of gains in efficiency from integration are in the forms of reduced transactions costs and economies of information a la Williamson (1970) .
A related question of importance is: Will the emergence of integrated health care provider systems reduce competition in individual markets?
The best predictive answer to this question, based on theoretical and limited empirical evidence, appears to be &dquo;Probably, no.&dquo; Empirical evidence, already presented, suggests that the level of economies of scale in any of the provider markets will not sustain natural monopoly providers. 25 The existence of individual providers independent from the integrated systems will be threatened only to the extent that these providers are less efficient than the integrated providers, in which case competitive efficiency is enhanced by their disappearance from the market.
The consumer is affected by the changes in risk sharing which are bringing about these structural changes in provider markets. The traditional service benefit and indemnity insurance plans did not tie the consumer to certain providers. Selection of an insurance plan by the consumer (patient) was not connected to the choice of providers. Similarly, the choice of referral services by the primary care physician-agent usually was uninhibited by the insurance plan. HMOs and PPOs place significant cost penalties on the patient for not using prespecified providers. The patient copayment when not using providers specified by the HMO is 100 percent; it can range from zero to 100 percent in PPOs, where it usually is substantially larger than the standard copayment. Thus, the consumer frequently is purchasing both insurance and providers in one package. Similarly, primary care physician-agents who participate in HMOs and PPOs are restricted to using certain providers for patient referrals.
Freedom of choice is reduced once an insurance mechanism or a provider has been identified. That choice will be determined by the consumers utility function driven by some combination of weights on price, quality and convenience. The trade-off the consumer receives for the forgone freedom of choice of all of the package components should be increased provider efficiency that is demonstrated in the forms of reduced cost per unit of quality or convenience. Finally, the consumer continues to have complete freedom of choice if he or she is willing to expend the required copayment. Therefore, there is no a priori reason to believe that this restructuring of risk sharing and the concomitant restructuring of providers will reduce competition. In fact, the theoretical and limited empirical evidence suggest quite the opposite.
Recall that the purpose of each of these types of integration is to reduce costs and enhance the patient base and revenues. Clearly, the incentive for these changes has been brought about by changes in reimbursement methods which place an increased risk of moral hazard on both the producers and consumers of health care services. Simultaneously, these changes are placing more reliance on competitive market forces to contain health care costs. It is not obvious that complete vertical integration, i.e., the merger of one type of provider or service firm into another, will always increase efficiency more than is attainable through alternative contracting services. However, it is clear that these structural changes are altering traditional choice patterns between patients and providers and among various provider types.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article was written with the intent of providing insight into problems in the hospital sector by relying heavily on published research viewed from the perspective of industrial organization. It is abundantly dear from this review that the problems in the hospital sector which are of concern to industrial organization economists are similar, if not identical, to those of concern to economists in other subspecialties such as labor, public finance, and applied microeconomic theory. Therefore, it would be presumptuous and egotistical to assert that the relatively recent (with a few exceptions) interest of economists in the field of industrial organization will bring dramatic new insights to this area.
One small, but very important, contribution to be made by economists specializing in industrial organization is to stress the fact that hospital services are bought and sold in markets. The important questions concern how efficiently the market is functioning: Are resources allocated efficiently? Is market behavior competitive? Is the result consistent with efficient market performance? In other words, research questions should address the causes and potential cures of market failure.
The increased emphasis on government policies and private reimbursement mechanisms that place greater reliance on appropriate market incentives by altering the behavior of providers is a recent phenomenon which has emerged almost simultaneously with increased state regulation of hospital rates. Thus, it is difficult to empirically separate the influences on market performance of &dquo;deregulation&dquo; from those of &dquo;reregulation&dquo;. Changes in the tax system appear to have the most promise of bringing about broad changes in the incentives of consumers. However, short of those changes, the private sector purchasers of health care services al-ready have made significant movements in the direction of efficient management of the health benefits package provided to employees, a movement placing pressures on providers to seek more efficient delivery systems.
Future research should be directed toward providing estimates of the efficiency and effectiveness of new health care delivery configurations. This will involve filling in the gaps that exist in hospital cost analyses, projecting appropriate product mixes for hospitals, and analyzing the role of proprietary hospitals and their impact on market performance. Can not-for-profit institutions function like efficient for-profit institutions? Do economies of scale justify multihospital systems? What effect will increased emphasis on competition have on hospital-doctor relations and the objectives of hospitals? What effect will increased price competition have on technological change? Can a more price competitive health care system support medical education? Underlying many of these issues is the very basic question that asks, &dquo;What is the nature of a sustainable price structure for hospital services?&dquo; Will that price structure be supported by adequate competition or are cost conditions such that monopolies will exist? Information imperfections have been a significant cause of market failure. Numerous issues concerning the types of information and their effects on hospital markets remain unresolved (Pauly and Langwell 1983) . Also, if direct regulation is replaced by reliance on the market, antitrust laws increase in importance as regulators of certain types of market behavior (Frech 1984) . Therefore, numerous research questions arise surrounding the appropriate application of these laws to correct problems of market behavior.
Clearly, the problems and changes occurring in the health care markets provide an almost endless list of theoretical and empirical questions for the future.
2. Unless otherwise cited, all data presented in this section appear in: Hospital Statistics. Chicago: American Hospital Association, 1984. 3. The American Hospital Association places under the rubric of community hospitals all nonfederal, short-term general and other special hospitals whose facilities and services are available to the public. 4. Of these specialized hospitals, 85.1 percent have a capacity in excess of 400 beds.
5. This is an application of the Elzinga and Hogarty principles of geographic market delineation (Elzinga and Hogarty 1973) . Elzinga and Hogarty contend that to appropriately delineate a geographic market, the analyst should conduct a two-step procedure. First, they suggest that, in a properly delineated market, only a small proportion of the product (hospital care) should be imported. Known as the "little in from outside" (LIFO) element, this corresponds to having a small number of patients living within the geographic area going outside to purchase hospital services. Second, they suggest that only a small proportion of the product should be exported; i.e., only a small proportion of the hospital services should be provided to patients living outside the geographic bounds of the market (LOFI). The obvious problem with this approach is that it provides for no exact percentage at which each of the two elements is satisfied. Elzinga and Hogarty suggest values of at least 75 percent; other economists have suggested higher values. 6. Small hospitals, usually offering fewer services than large community and/or teaching hospitals, compete directly with large hospitals for the services offered by both. There is a significant flow of patients who live close to smaller hospitals to the larger hospitals located further from their residences. This may be due to the larger facility's ability to offer additional equipment and personnel support in case of complications. Similarly, there is a significant flow of patients living near one large hospital to a more distant hospital within the nearby metropolitan area. 7. Summary measures in this section were derived from data provided by H. E. Frech, III, University of California, Santa Barbara, using 1975 data.
8. Joskow used the Herfindahl index to describe market structure in an earlier paper (Joskow 1980 ). This index is the sum of S 2 i for all the firms in the market where S i represents market share of firm i. The n-firm concentration ratio is the sum of the S i for the top n firms. The Herfindahl index provides a more encompassing measure of market structure than the twoor four-firm concentration ratio (Schmalensee 1977) . However, these data were not available to the authors. 9. Rural areas offer a picture different from large metropolitan areas. Often the local hospital is small, with the ability to provide only limited services. Patient flow follows the patterns of larger metropolitan areas even though distances may be greater. The rural hospital is then in direct competition with other small and larger hospitals in the nearest communities. In fact, in sparsely populated states such as Nebraska and Kansas, patients travel significant distances to purchase hospital services, often leapfrogging cities that have hospitals offering the needed services in order to purchase those services at regional tertiary care centers. This latter factor complicates the problem of market delineation in both rural and metropolitan areas. 10. Information in the following paragraphs also comes from: Hospital Statistics. Chicago: American Hospital Association, 1984. 11 . See Cowing, Holtman, and Powers (1983) for a summary of these studies. 12. It has the advantage of providing for direct measurement of any degree of economies of scope which may result from the multiservice outputs of hospitals. 13. However, there are two significant weaknesses in this research. First, the translog estimation process requires a very large sample size to be efficient. Cowing and Holtman could divide all hospital outputs into only five very broad categories, each of which contain very diverse procedures ranging from those that are common and simple to very sophisticated procedures. Generally, only larger hospitals offer the more sophisticated procedures. Therefore, the results of such an estimation may not reveal much of the true behavior of the multiproduct cost functions. Second, these estimates provide only a limited ability to estimate long-run conditions, the results of which do not relate directly to the product mix of the hospital. 14. Obviously, the validity of the cost functions discussed in the previous section is suspect if this has not been taken into account in the estimation procedure. (See Feldstein 1974; Cowing, Holtman, and Powers 1983.) 15. These plans still account for almost 50 percent of the private health insurance written nationwide.
16. The Blues were required to use community-rating systems, leaving room for the commercial plans in many areas to offer better rates to certain groups within these areas.
17. These programs have followed a variety of regulatory schemes, usually with some level of budget review. Many aspects of rate regulation are similar to traditional utility regulation. 18. A more complete discussion is found in Langwell and Moore 1982, Pauly and Langwell 1983. 19. Currently, costs of physician services, ancillary services, outpatient services, and capital costs are not included in the DRGs. 20. While the program will cause some short-term disruptions and burdens, it should provide incentives for more efficient behavior. 21. Selective price cutting beyond the official DRG levels is being used by hospitals to attract Medicare patients and alleviate some of their excess capacity. There are situations in which hospitals with low occupancy rates are advertising that they will treat Medicare patients who meet certain minimum income levels with a complete waiver of copayments and deductibles. Medicare patients above these income levels receive various discounts on hospital and physician deductibles and copayments. Other hospitals are offering fixed maximum charges for all Medicare copayments and deductibles. No documentation is available on the number of health care providers offering these types of discounts; however, popular knowledge seems to be that they are not uncommon. 22. See: National Industry Council for HMO Development. The Health Mainte-nance Organization Ten-Year Report: 1973 . Washington D.C.: The Council, 1984 23. Notably, there has been a lower rate of growth in specialty ob-gyn centers. 24. Many of the older group practices were established either under the umbrella of a prepaid health plan or as tertiary care centers. The Kaiser-Permanente group in California and the Group Health Association of Washington, D.C., are examples of the former. The Mayo Clinic, the Virginia Mason Hospital Clinic in Seattle, and the Carle Clinic in Urbana, Ill., are examples of the latter. In recent years, many of the groups in the latter category have integrated vertically into the insurance market by offering HMOs. 25 . Even though economies of scale exist in the insurance function, these economies would not necessarily sustain a single insurer in a market, i.e., the economies can be gained by having portions of various geographic markets.
